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own image God made humankind.” The warrant is
God’s creating human beings in the divine image
rather than a specific political arrangement, say,
theocracy. The background is also the sixth com-
mandment, “You shall not kill” (Exod 20 : 13), even
when interpreted in terms of murder and not kill-
ing. Punishment for idolatry has different warrant
than shedding blood and is not dependent on the
state or the sixth commandment. In Matt 15 : 4, Je-
sus teaches that “whoever speaks evil of father or
mother must surely die.” Yet there is no specifica-
tion of the means of punishment, and Jesus, even
facing crucifixion, never resorts to force. Within the
Gospels there is an emphasis on forgiveness, al-
though the state’s power of capital punishment is
not denied. Apostle Paul continues the theme. A
leader holding legitimate authority, indeed author-
ity from God, “does not bear the sword in vain! It
is the servant of God to execute wrath on the
wrongdoer” (Rom 13 : 4). Thus, the Bible contains
various warrants for capital punishment (divine
command, the human as the image of God, the
right of a legitimate state, etc.) which assert the se-
riousness of the violation of the sixth command-
ment and the sovereignty of God.
Besides diversity in the Bible, Christians have
drawn on different theological and ethical ideas in
order to consider the legitimacy of capital punish-
ment. Two basic patterns of thinking are dominant,
East and West. Many understand Jesus’ teaching
presented in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt 5–7)
to require the rejection of violence and the demand
of pacifism. The argument is twofold: the prohibi-
tion in the sixth commandment is absolute and
without exception, and, further, the example of Je-
sus’ action is normative for Christian life. The
Christian community is to be a community of peace
emblematic of the reign of God. Menno Simons and
the subsequent Peace Church tradition, for in-
stance, assert that Christians should not take vows
or bear arms because Jesus did not. Capital punish-
ment is contrary to the Gospel, and its use among
Christian too easily makes the church an agent of
the state. While the state is a legitimate social form,
it is not needed among Christians. In recent times
some Orthodox leaders focus on the centrality of
forgiveness as reasons against capital punishment.
Other thinkers have noted that capital punishment
is often used against the poor. Christian commit-
ment to the poor should alert one to abuses of
state power.
The other dominant line of thinking draws on
different biblical, theological, and ethical warrants.
From Augustine to Martin Luther and John Calvin
as well as the long-tradition of just war thinking
and also Orthodox thinkers many arguments have
been made for the right use of lethal force, includ-
ing capital punishment. The crucial claim, vari-
ously conceived, is that Christians exist within the
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“earthly city” (Augustine), under two govern-
ments – church and state – (Calvin), in two king-
doms (Luther), or in the “symphonic” relation of
church and state (Orthodox). Recent Christian real-
ists continue the insight. Christians cannot escape
the vicissitudes of social and historical life, and the
ambiguities of history and society mean that in cer-
tain situations of self defense, preservation and res-
toration of civil peace, and the protection of the
weak and innocent, justice may require the use of
lethal force. The work of justice, including retribu-
tive justice, can be merciful. Augustine argued that
punishment keeps the sinner from further sin and
endangering their souls, a position that historically
took a fateful turn in the execution of heretics. Yet
the idea is that justice must approximate Christian
love, and, further, Christian commitments to for-
giveness cannot compromise the demands of jus-
tice. Mindful of the ambiguity and possible abuse
of political power, in this pattern of thought God
is held sovereign over all things, and there are
goods which systems of justice must protect.
Divergent biblical warrants on capital punish-
ment and the dominant strands of thinking inter-
sect with different conceptions of the purpose of
punishment. If punishment is to reform the wrong-
doer, then capital punishment terminates that pos-
sibility and is morally illicit. Conversely, if punish-
ment is to restrain wickedness, restore peace after
its violation, punish the sinner, or manifest the
wrath of God, then capital punishment might be
justified. Each account of punishment is found
among Christians, and they cohere with the biblical
warrants and the theological ethical arguments
noted.
There is no unified Christian position on capital
punishment and this fact flows from diversity
within the Bible, different conceptions of the rela-
tion of the church to historical and socio-political
realities, and, finally, disputes about the purpose
of punishment. Despite contrasting judgments, the
impact of the Christian tradition over time has been
to mitigate excessive expressions of retributive jus-
tice with the message of mercy and forgiveness.
Bibliography: ■ Bailey, L. R./J. M. Efird, Capital Punishment:
What the Bible Says (Nashville, Tenn. 1986). ■ Berkowitz, B.
A., Execution and Invention: Death Penalty Discourse in Early Rab-
binic and Christian Cultures (Oxford 2006). ■ Megivern, J. J.,
The Death Penalty: An Historical and Theological Survey (New
York 1997). ■ Stassen, G. (ed.), Captial Punishment: A Reader
(Cleveland, Ohio 1998).
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II. Judaism
The Bible specifies capital punishment for a wide
range of crimes against both God and man. Distinct
and paradoxical political realia, however, circum-
scribe its interpretation and implementation in
postbiblical Judaism. Capital jurisdiction is a test
case of political autonomy, and in the postbiblical
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era, full Jewish political autonomy has been limited
to the Second Temple era and the State of Israel. In
Second Temple Judaism, executions fell primarily
under the jurisdiction (or discretion) of the sover-
eign, such as Alexander Jannaeus or Herod. Any ties
understood to have existed between executions and
biblical strictures are unclear.
Only in the rabbinic period (2nd–5th cents. CE),
when Jews had no capital jurisdiction, do we find
extensive treatment of the topic in biblical terms.
The trajectories of the rabbinic discussion are
twofold:
(1) The rabbis give vivid detail to the schematic
biblical picture of capital punishment, discussing:
which crimes merit death; the composition of the
court; collection of evidence; interrogation of wit-
nesses; conduct of judges throughout the trial; the
precise modes of execution; and even the proper
mourning by the family of the executed. According
to rabbinic law, a person accused of a capital offense
must be tried before a court of 23 judges (mSan 1 : 4)
and accused by two sanctioned witnesses, who in
the course of proving guilt with epistemological
certainty, must also prove that the accused was
warned of the precise consequences of the crime
and had acknowledged the warning prior to the
crime (mSan 5 : 1–4; bSan 8b, 40b). If condemned,
the crime merits one of four punishments: stoning,
burning, beheading, or strangling (mSan 6–7). Of
these, only stoning and burning have clear biblical
antecedents. The biblical authority of the other two
are driven by hermeneutical, jurisprudential, and
theological principles, and are in places clearly in-
fluenced by the Roman milieu in which they were
articulated.
(2) Mishnah Makkot 1 : 10 reads:
A sanhedrin that executes once in seven years, is called
murderous. R. Eliezer b. Azariah says: once in seventy
years. R. Tarfon and R. Aqiva say: If we were members
of a sanhedrin, no person would ever be put to death.
Rabban Simeon ben Gamaliel remarked: They would
also multiply murderers in Israel.
This Mishnah holds contradictory views in tension,
namely the belief that the evils of capital punish-
ment outweigh its legality and the belief that capi-
tal punishment prevents even more bloodshed. The
rabbis thus weave a second strain of biblical inter-
pretation throughout their explication of the pro-
cess, one that radically questions and functionally
rejects human authority over capital punishment
either on the basis of its inherent wrongness or on
the basis of the flawed nature of the human tribu-
nal and the fear of error. Exaggerated standards of
proof make conviction all but impossible. Even the
odd descriptions of how to kill the condemned en-
code moral imperatives, such as the need to mini-
mize human suffering (cf. Lev 19 : 18 “love your
neighbor as yourself”) and to preserve dignity. The
body, as the image of God, should remain unblem-
ished, and the executioner, whose actions should
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imitate the way God himself kills (mSan 4 : 5; bSan
45a, 52b; MekY Neziqin 5). The rabbis interlace the
discussion of capital punishment with implicit and
explicit explorations of morality, anthropology,
theology, epistemology, jurisprudence, and, to a
lesser extent, politics.
Medieval commentators within the rabbinic tra-
dition mostly reiterate these traditional positions.
Maimonides states: “It is better and more satisfac-
tory to acquit a thousand guilty persons than to put
a single innocent man to death” (Sefer ha-Mitswot,
negative commandments 290). However, in con-
trast to the classical rabbis, in the Middle Ages,
some Jewish communities, e.g., in Muslim Spain,
had capital authority and used it, albeit in a spo-
radic and limited way. Given both the absence of
a sanhedrin and the broader talmudic abrogation,
however, execution struck some as illegitimate, and
there seem to have been attempts to avoid directly
transgressing rabbinic law, for example, executing
the condemned by extrarabbinic modes or out of
deference to custom (Assaf: no. 28). A tradition tied
to the talmudic discussion of the Noahide laws
builds a conceptual edifice permitting execution on
less stringent evidentiary standards so as to serve
the demands of ruling a community. Some sources
argue for exemption from the demands of certainty
that restrained the rabbinic court, placing the inter-
ests of the community over those of strict justice
(e.g., Isaac bar Sheshet, Responsa Ribash 234, 251
[late 14th cent.]); cited in Nagar vs. State of Israel
[1980] (in Elon 1999: 202); bSan 57b; Maimonides,
MishT, Sefer Shoftim, Hilkhot Melakhim 9 : 14).
In modern Israel, after initial debate, capital
punishment was rejected on the basis of humanitar-
ian arguments built on rabbinic grounds. It is per-
mitted only in cases of treason, genocide, and
crimes against the Jewish people. Note that in Is-
rael, licit execution happens by shooting or hang-
ing, neither of which is a rabbinic mode. The Nazi
war criminal Adolph Eichmann was the only person
ever executed in Israel; he was hanged in 1962.
Orthodox Judaism holds that since capital pun-
ishment is mandated by God, execution is not in
itself repugnant. However, the lack of a truly pious
court renders it impossible to administer. The other
branches of Judaism draw on similar sources and
ideas but more directly confront execution as itself
problematic. However, debate remains open, and
each side can claim talmudic and biblical proof-
texts.
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III. Islam
Capital punishment in Islamic discourse is mainly
associated with crimes or transgressions committed
by man against the will of God (crimes against fel-
low humans are called tazı̄r). The Qurān informs
the reader/listener about the høudūd Allāh, “God’s
boundaries.” This phrase occurs 12 times in the
Qurān, for example, “These are God’s boundaries,
do not approach them” (S 2 : 187), and “These are
God’s boundaries, do not transgress them. Whoever
does transgress God’s boundaries, those are the
wrongdoers” (S 2 : 229). These two examples indi-
cate that høudūd Allāh are a warning to prevent peo-
ple from committing crimes. Some theologians
hold that it is better to be disciplined and repent in
this life than to end up in hell. From this point of
view, it is clear that høudūd (sg. høadd) is part and par-
cel of the qurānic reward and punishment stories.
Those believers who remain within the boundaries
shall be rewarded in the afterlife, while sinners will
be tormented in hell.
As R. Kimber (2001) points out, there is a simi-
larity between the qurānic høudūd and the biblical
høuqqı̄m/høuqqōt (boundaries, statutes of God; cf. Lev
18 : 4–5, 26; 19 : 19, 37; 26 : 3, 15; Num 30 : 17; Deut
5 : 1; 6 : 1, 24; 26 : 16–7; Exod 18 : 16). Both the
Qurān and the HB/OT mainly discuss these con-
cepts in relation to marital or family relations. Even
though there are many similarities, there are also
important differences between Islamic and Judaic
jurisprudence (cf. Kimber 2001).
The application of høudūd Allāh is dependent on
theological interpretations of the Sharı̄‘a, which, it
is clear, have varied over time and depend on local
contexts. However, this concept is generally associ-
ated with adultery, fornication, theft, highway rob-
bery, use of intoxicants and apostasy, all crimes that
should be punished with corporal punishment (in
the form of flogging, stoning and amputations).
The strictest punishments are applied in Saudi Ara-
bia and Iran, but elsewhere in the modern Muslim
world they have fallen largely into disuse (Pearl
1995: 1). Islamists in countries such as Pakistan, Su-
dan and Nigeria have nonetheless lately cam-
paigned for the re-introduction and application of
the høudūd punishments.
The main difference between the so-called
høudūd crimes and other felonies is the important
fact that the sin is committed against God and not
against humankind. Consequently, the strictness of
the judgments and the severity of the penalties im-
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posed are based on the fact that it is the “right of
God” (høaqq Allāh) to chastize those who transgress
his boundaries/limits (Carra de Vaux: 116).
Bibliography: ■ Carra de Vaux, B., “H add,” Shorter Encyclo-
paedia of Islam (Leiden 41995 [= 11953]) 115–16. ■ Kimber,
R., “Boundaries and Precepts,” Encyclopaedia of the Qurān 1
(Leiden/Boston, Mass. 2001) 252–54. ■ Pearl, D. S.,
“H udūd,” The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World
(New York/Oxford 1995) 137–38.
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IV. Literature
In “As I please” (Nov. 1944), Orwell wisely retracts
his comment that no one “ever writes of an execu-
tion with approval.” The God of Gen 9 actually re-
quires capital punishment because, if man is made
in God’s image, murder is blasphemous. Inconsist-
ently, rather than killing David for murdering
Uriah, God condemns David and Bathsheba’s child
(2 Sam 12). However, although the Torah prescribes
death for sins ranging from homosexuality (Lev 20)
to Sabbath-breaking (Exod 31) and rape (Deut 22),
talmudic “barriers” ensure that it is rarely imposed
(Rosenberg: 1169); the Jews tell Pilate that it is un-
lawful for them to execute anyone (John 18). While
Paul concedes the state’s right to execute citizens
(Rom 13), Jesus prevents the Pharisees from stoning
an adulterous woman (John 8).
Condemned Christians often imitate Christ’s
example of patient courage: St. Stephen (Acts 6–8)
and St. Cecilia in Chaucer’s “Second Nun’s Tale”
(ca. 1390) face death with rousing speeches; Thomas
More’s letter to his daughter (1535) hopes that “we
may merrily meet in heaven”; and in Marvell’s “Ho-
ratian Ode” (1650), Charles I lays his head on the
scaffold “as upon a Bed.” Both Villon in “Ballade
des Pendus” (ca. 1450) and Cawdor in Shakespeare’s
Macbeth (1606) express repentance. In contrast,
Tichborne’s “Elegy” (1586) voices a youth’s despair
at what Orwell’s “A Hanging” (1931) calls “The un-
speakable wrongness … of cutting a life short … in
full tide.”
The trope of Christian acceptance leads some
novelists to mute execution’s horror: Dickens’s sen-
timental account of Carton’s death in A Tale of Two
Cities (1859); Melville’s “Billy Budd” (1891), where
the “angelic” hero does not twitch when hanged;
the reprieve of the infanticide Hetty in George El-
iot’s Adam Bede (1859). Without a victim’s accept-
ance, capital punishment is doubly appalling: the
murderer in Hugo’s Le dernier jour d’un condamné
(1829) crying inwardly that it is “impossible” that
he will not receive mercy; Fagin’s last terrified, un-
repentant night in Dickens’s Oliver Twist (1838).
However, the observer’s acceptance in Wordsworth’s
“Sonnets on the Punishment of Death” (1839)
seems pietistic; in Boswell’s Life of Samuel Johnson
(1791), Johnson offers Dodds spiritual comfort
rather than questioning so harsh a penalty for for-
gery. Boswell’s own obsession with hangings is a
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